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Introduction
This paper discusses a number of long-term global trends that are likely to affect
the ambition of the EU to be a global actor. Being or becoming a global power
is indeed not only determined by an internal and voluntary policy of that actor.
It also depends on a number of external forces. The first part of this paper will
present two ongoing transformations of the world that together are weakening
the position of the EU as an aspiring global power. The first trend is a shift in
economic gravity from the East to the West. The second trend is a demographic
decline in Europe. Both trends make it increasingly difficult for the EU to be a
global power. But at the same time one can also identify a number of develop-
ments with regard to multilateralism that bear in them opportunities for the EU
to increase its influence as a global actor. The second part of this paper focuses
on two such trends, the shift to multipolarity and the changes in the multilateral
architecture. As for the latter, this paper introduces the notion of ‘multilateral-
ism 2.0.’ as a metaphor to grasp these changes.
It will be argued that the described trends are of particular relevance for the
European Security Strategy as they imply that Europe’s prosperity and stability
is increasingly determined by outside forces and by changes in the geo-political
world-order. As such the challenge for the EU is twofold:
– To make sure that it can act as one of the poles in the emerging multipolar
order;
– To contribute to shape that multipolar order into one that strengthens global
governance.
Finally, it will be argued that the EU can under the given circumstances only
affirm itself as a global power if two conditions are fulfilled:
– The EU deepens its integration with the rest of the Western world; and
– The EU steps up its role as a change-agent in the multileral system.
Together these two issues have the potential to balance the forces that are weak-
ening the position of Europe as a global actor. But in order to capitalise on this
potential, Europe also needs an ambitious new ‘story-line’ or grand strategy.
The paper ends with presenting some possible avenues for such a storyline.
Luk Van Langenhove1
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views of the UN. The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Commu-
nity’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement n° 225722 (EU-GRASP
Project).5
1. Forces that are weakening the Position of 
the EU as a Global Actor
For a long time the EU has had ambitions and capacities to play a global role,
especially in ‘first pillar’ domains such as trade, development, environment and
social issues (see Orbie, 2008 for an overview). More recently the EU increas-
ingly develops a security strategy and architecture with global ambitions as well
(see Tardy, 2009 for an overview). With the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has even
made an important step forward in realising its global aspirations (Van Langen-
hove and Marchesi, 2009; Van Langenhove and Costea, 2007). Jean-Luc
Dehaene, former Vice-President of the European Convention and one of the
defenders of the idea of a European Constitution, recently described the Lisbon
Treaty as ‘a new European quantum leap’ that allows Europe to operate as a
global actor (interview in Knack, 25 November 2009).
These European ambitions are in line with an old tradition in Europe to see itself
as an actor that could and should play a role in the world to the extent that the
rest of the world is even supposed to mirror Europe. This has been described as
‘Europeanisation’.2 Indeed, Europe, and by extension ‘the West’, has ever since
the birth of the Industrial Revolution been the centre of gravity of the world.
Not only were there the scientific and technological inventions that gave rise to
unprecedented boosts in productivity that detached Europe (followed by the
USA) from the rest of the world (Steingart, 2008). There were also institutional
and political inventions such as the birth of the liberal state and the idea that
peace and trade were interlinked. Combined with new ideas about sovereignty,
legitimacy of state power and nationalism this resulted in a system of interstate
competition that further “opened up huge economic asymmetries in the world
economy, revolutionized international transport, and helped to cement the geo-
political dominance of Europe over Africa and Asia” (Findlay and O’Rourke,
2007, p. 364). Meanwhile, “Western values and assumptions have been inter-
nalised to a remarkable degree in almost every other major culture” (Roberts,
1985, p. 278). Today, as mentioned by Sapir (2007), the EU is the world leading
exporter of goods, largest trader of services and biggest donor of both develop-
ment and humanitarian aid, the second largest foreign investor and the second
destination for foreign migrants. Moreover, the Euro has become the second
most important currency and the EUs GDP equals that of the US.
2.  Young (1937) defines Europeanisation as a term ‘intended to express the effects on Asiatic, American
and African cultures and civilisations of permeation by the peculiar social system set up in modern
Europe”. See Kühnhardt (2008, pp. 9-12) for a discussion of this concept.THE EU AS A GLOBAL ACTOR IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD AND MULTILATERAL 2.0 ENVIRONMENT
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And yet, one can also speak today of a ‘European malaise’ (cf. Beck and Grande,
2007, p. 3) and claim that the heydays of Europe are over and that its economic
and political power are declining. There are many signs that a top has been
reached and that the indicators go downhill from here. At the time of writing
this essay, the world just witnessed how at the COP15 meeting in Copenhagen,
Europe was excluded from the final negotiations. And there is accumulating
evidence for the decline of European industry. Traditional industries are losing
markets and the most competitive companies become targets of take-overs from
Asia. This can be related to a combination of two factors: the external factor of
the “the rise of the rest” and the internal factor of demographic developments.3
1.1. The Economic Gravity Shift from West to East
The US is still the most powerful economy in the world and the EU is second in
size, but the fact that the BRICs are gaining economic power is already an
unmistakable trend. And, more specifically, China and India are becoming eco-
nomic giants that account for a huge share in growth of the world’s GIP. Predic-
tions are that, by 2050, the part of the EU’s and the US’ shares of world eco-
nomic output are going to further decrease dramatically. A recent foresight exer-
cise organized by the European Commission4 foresees that before 2025, China
could become the second world economic power of the world and India the
sixth, ahead of Italy and behind France. The same study predicts that the
exports of the EU would count for 32% of the world volume in 2025 while the
share of Asia will be 35%. The EU will then no longer be the first world
exporter. At the same time, Europe (and the US) is losing its scientific and tech-
nological supremacy to the benefit of Asia. One indicator is R&D: as other
regions of the world step up their R&D investments, the EU’s relative impor-
tance to world innovation is going down. Its global share of patent applications
for instance has dropped 14% over the past 6 years.5 The Eurocentric world is
now at long last a thing of the past, and so is the Transatlantic predominance of
the West (Fritz-Vannahme, 2009, p.3). On top of it, the present financial crisis
seems to have accentuated if not accelerated this trend. Roger Altman (2009)
3.  There is no shortage of reports and studies that present assessments of the situation of Europe in the
world. See for instance Gnesotto and Grevi (2006) and The European Commission’s Report ‘The World
in 2025’ (2009) available at http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/pdf/the-world-in-2025-
report_en.pdf. See also the METRIS (2009) report II – a report by an expert group set up by the European
Commission of which the author of this paper was a member – for a discussion of major trends in society
and their implications on research-agendas in social sciences and humanities. The METRIS report is avail-
able at http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/pdf/metris-report_en.pdf
4.  ‘The World in 2025’ (2009). See footnote 1.
5.  Data from the UN World Population Ageing Report, quoted in Gnesotto and Grevi (2006).THE EU AS A GLOBAL ACTOR IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD AND MULTILATERAL 2.0 ENVIRONMENT
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labeled the present financial crisis ‘The Great Crash 2008’ and described it as a
geographical setback for the West.
1.2. The Declining Demography
Assuming that no catastrophic events will happen, the world population is
expected to grow from approximately 6.6 billion in 2009 to approximately 8
billion in 2025 and 97% of that growth will occur in the developing countries.
As a consequence, while the world population continues to grow, the percentage
of people living in the ‘West’ is continuing to decline. And within Europe the
working age population will continue to shrink. As mentioned in the METRIS
(2009) report, demography is coming back as an important element in the
understanding of contemporary transformations. It is predicted that, by 2030,
75% of all people on the planet will live in Asia and Africa. And the population
of the EU will account for 6.5% of the world population.6 This will have con-
sequences for multilateralism as membership and voting rights in multilateral
organizations will need to adapt to that reality. Currently, the West is already
overrepresented. Europe’s weight in the global institutions in terms of seats and/
or votes is increasingly exceeding its relative share in population or GDP
(Ahearne, 2006, p.3).
Together these economic and demographic challenges affect the EU’s strive to
become a global power. Put bluntly: it looks like Europe will have neither the
people nor the economic weight for it. And on top of it, Europe is likely to face
moral challenges as well that will even question its ability to exercise soft power.
Indeed, being the epicenter of humanity for so long has resulted in Europe being
a provider of a number of social innovations and related values that have shaped
today’s world. These include the separation between state and religion, the con-
cepts of free market and democracy, the principles of sovereignty and regional
integration, etc… A lot of these principles go back to both the American and
French Revolution. Each time it are European (or Western) inventions which
were then trough colonialism or other means exported to the rest of the world.
But the question is to what extent the rest of the world will continue to see these
values as having a universal character? It remains to be seen to what extent the
economic shift in gravity and the demographic decline will influence these
debates and how it will affect the positions of those who believe that for instance
Human Rights do have a universal value, notwithstanding the cultural diversity
of the globe.
6.  See the E.C. Report “The World in 2025” and also Gnesotto and Grevi (2006).9
2. Changes in the Multilateral System
Being – or not being – a global power, is not only a matter of one’s relatively
strength. It is also determined by the playing fields or ‘theatres’ where such
power and influence can manifest themselves. These ‘theatres’ are by now
largely institutionalized in the so-called multilateral system with its political
(UN) and economic (WTO, IMF…) components. It is there where states meet
and interact and even bilateral relations are often limited by what the multilat-
eral rules allow. Even those who dreamt of a unipolar world still needed to take
into account the existence and the (relative) legitimacy of the multilateral system
(Calleo, 2009). In other words, being a global power cannot be realized outside
the theatres of multilateralism. But as it happens, those theatres are in full
change as well, partly because of the shift to so-called multipolarity which is
related to the trends described above. Partly also because of the changing nature
of the related concepts of global governance and legitimacy.
2.1. The Shift to Multipolarity
Multilateral relations between states are not a game where all players have equal
rights and duties. There are also power differences between states. Thinking
about multilateralism can hence not be done without referring to the world-
order and to the way international relations are organised in terms of power.
World-order, sometimes also called ‘international order’ has been defined by
Bull (2002, p. 8) as: ‘a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary
goals of the society of states, or international society’. For Bull, this included
maintaining the sovereignty of states and the absence of war. Within this frame-
work one can picture ‘poles’ (sometimes also labelled as ‘powers’) as states
endowed with the resources, political will and institutional ability to project
their interests at the global level.
From this perspective, the world has for a long time been organised around a
‘bi-polar’ frame: the deep rift between East and West and its precarious balance
built upon the MAD principle. With the end of the Cold War, it was said that
the world had become ‘uni-polar’ (Krauthammer, 1990) with the US as ‘lonely
superpower’. But since 2001 there are numerous signs and developments that
testify that the unipolar moment of the US has come to an end. This does not
necessarily implies a weakening of the US. As noted by Zakaria (2008, p. 2), the
current shift to multipolarity can be seen as largely due to ‘the rise of the rest’:
the unprecedented economic growth over the past decades in countries all over
the world. ‘Multi-polarity’ is indeed the new catch-word. Others such as HaassTHE EU AS A GLOBAL ACTOR IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD AND MULTILATERAL 2.0 ENVIRONMENT
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speak of a ‘non-polar’ world: “a world dominated not by one or two or several
states but rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising various kinds of
power” (Haass, 2008, p. 44) and the Economist even mentioned the birth of a
‘neo-polar’ world.7 Although, given the increased interconnectivity and interde-
pendences between the poles, one could also speak of inter-polarity, as Grevi
(2008) does. While it is certainly true that the position of the US has weakened
in recent years, this does not mean however that we can now picture the world-
order as one where several (super)powers compete with each other for domi-
nance. Impressed by the rapid economic growth of the BRIC countries, it is
often assumed that multipolarity is already there. But such pronouncements
mistake current trajectories for final outcomes (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2009,
p. 55). Reality is that there is still only one state with a global predominance:
the US. The other poles are (still?) more regional than global (Brazil, India,
China and Russia). A crucial issue in all this is the relationship between hegem-
ony and the regional poles. Acharya has rightly pointed to the crucial role of
hegemons in defining and organising regions and to the centrality of regional
security in world politics. He therefore proposes to speak about ‘regiopolarity’
rather than multipolarity’ (Acharya, 2009, p. 7). Consequently, he sees the
future as a regiopolar world-order (see also Acharya, 2010). The question then
is if there is a role for the EU to become the representative of the European pole
in this regional word-order? Or is the world not really moving in that direction
and is a new bipolarity emerging? One with the US and China as global powers?
The COP-15 meeting of December 2009 in Copenhagen showed in any case an
interesting phenomenon: the final agreement was reached in a meeting where
the EU, or for that matter any European member state, was absent. In other
words, if the world-order moves in the direction of multi- or even regiopolarity,
then the EU will have to fight to get a (power) position that equals its ambitions.
2.2. The Current Crisis of Multilateralism
The present system of multilateralism has its origins in the Second World War
and the failure of its precursor, the League of Nations. At its heart lies the world-
view of Franklin Roosevelt who strived for a world founded upon four essential
human freedoms: the freedom of expression, the freedom of religion, the free-
dom from want and the freedom from fear. For this to be realised, Roosevelt
dreamt of a single organisation at the global level that would bring all states
together in order to maintain international peace and security, develop interna-
tional cooperation in solving common economic, social and cultural problems,
and promote and encourage human rights and fundamental freedoms.
7.  Quoted in Acharya (2009).THE EU AS A GLOBAL ACTOR IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD AND MULTILATERAL 2.0 ENVIRONMENT
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Roosevelt first suggested the name ‘United Nations’ in 1942. On 26 June 1945
the UN Charter was signed, marking an important date in the history of multi-
lateralism. Between 1945 and 2000 lots of other regional and global interstate
structures have been created to help to deal with the world problems. Today
what is called the ‘multilateral system’ consists of a myriad of agencies and insti-
tutions but a central place is given to the UN and the so-called Bretton Woods
institutions. Of course the principles of multilateralism go back further than
1945. One can link them to the emergence of a Westphalian world-order built
upon sovereign states and the possibilities and necessities for those states to
cooperate with each other. Westphalia developed slowly over three and a half
centuries and was never consolidated into one single document. Neither was the
1648 Treaty directly responsible for the creation of what we now call the mod-
ern or liberal constitutional sovereign state. The world-order based upon a state
system should rather be seen as an unintended consequence of Westphalia
(Valaskis, 2001, p. 48). It is a result of putting the sovereignty principle into
practice that states became what they are: territorial entities that exclude exter-
nal actors from domestic authority (Krasner, 1999). This in turn opened the
room for a body of international law based on treaties between sovereign states.
Multilateralism was thus created as a form of cooperation among states that
institutionalises intergovernmental co-operation and substitutes anarchy. Start-
ing-point for most scholars who study multilateralism is the definition by
Keohane and its expansion by Ruggie. “I limit multilateralism to arrangements
involving states” says Keohane (1990, p. 732) and that is a core issue of most
of the academic thinking on the issue. Multilateral arrangements are institutions
defined by Keohane as “persistent sets of rules that constrain activity, shape
expectations and prescribe roles” (Keohane, 1988, p.384) in a purely institu-
tional (rather than normative) manner. Ruggie however, presents a definition
that is not only institutional but also normative, including behaviour. For
Ruggie, multilateralism is “an institutional form that coordinates relations
among three or more states on the basis of generalised principles of conduct (…)
which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard for the
particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in
any specific occurrence” (Ruggie, 1993, p. 11). Ikenberry states that multilater-
alism operates at three levels of international order: system multilateralism,
ordering or foundational multilateralism, and contract multilateralism. Multi-
lateralism, he continues, can also be understood in terms of its sources. It can
emerge from the international system’s structural features, the independent
influence of pre-existing multilateral institutions, domestic politics and finally
multilateralism can be traced to agentic sources (Ikenberry, 2003). So there are
many varieties of multilateralism. Multilateralism is a highly demanding institu-
tional form.THE EU AS A GLOBAL ACTOR IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD AND MULTILATERAL 2.0 ENVIRONMENT
12
It is a truism to say that the world has changed profoundly since multilateralism
emerged and became institutionalized in its present form. But still it is good to
recall some of the key elements of those changes. Firstly, when the UN was
founded, 2/3 of its current members did not even exist as sovereign states as their
people were still living under colonial rule. In 1948 there existed only 74 states
in the world. Today, we are close to 200 states. Most of those states are relatively
small (about half of today’s existing states have a population of less than 5 mil-
lion). The more states take part in the multilateral system, the more difficult it
becomes to govern it.
Secondly, when the UN was created, the world was not as ‘globalised’ as today.
Trade barriers were high and so were transport and communications costs.
Today, world exports have risen to extraordinary levels. Technological advances
have created a new context for connectivity amongst people, industries and gov-
ernments. Globalisation is the buzz-word. However, the benefits and opportu-
nities of globalisation remain highly concentrated among a small number of
states. And while there have been successful efforts to craft strong rules facilitat-
ing the expansion of global markets, the social dimensions of this are far less
covered by global labour standards. In other words, the multilateral system is
unevenly developed. There is a relatively strong institutionalised form of eco-
nomic multilateralism (cf. WTO, IMF and World bank) and political multilat-
eralism (cf. UN Security Council). Its functioning can be critically assessed and
although as mentioned before, there are some success stories to report, there is
also a track record of failures. The present crisis of the Doha Development
Round and the inability to reform the composition and functioning of the Secu-
rity Council are just two examples.
Multilateralism is clearly under challenge in the 21st century and has been so
since the end of the Cold War. More than a reflection of the failure of the con-
cept, this crisis is the sign of a changing international context, which has ren-
dered the traditional intergovernmental multilateralism of the post WWII-era
anachronistic. In today’s reality, states play a relatively minor role as protago-
nists in the security system, as threats have acquired a system-wide significance.
In order to overcome this crisis, the multilateral institutions, namely the UN,
need to adapt to this change, reinventing themselves according to the new con-
text. Thus, as the world is changing, so must the concept of governance, namely
its reflection in the multilateral system. The developments of the past years have
put severe strain on many of the traditional principles and tenets of multilater-
alism. Part of this is translated into a critique of how the UN functions. Many
authors have pointed to all kinds of dysfunctions such as the complexity of the
UN system with its decentralised, overlapping and incoherent array of councils
and agencies or the divides between developed and developing countries. But, asTHE EU AS A GLOBAL ACTOR IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD AND MULTILATERAL 2.0 ENVIRONMENT
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Weiss (2008) noted: the core problem is systemic and rooted in a mismatch
between an organisation founded to serve and protect sovereign states and the
actual presence of global problems that go beyond the interest of individual
states. The emergence of truly global problems such as climate change, prolifer-
ation of weapons of mass destruction and many others have indeed led to an
increasing paradox of governance: “The policy authority for tackling global
problems still belongs to the states, while the sources of the problems and poten-
tial solutions are situated at transnational, regional or global level” (Thakur and
Van Langenhove, 2005). As such the building blocks of multilateralism, the
states, seem to be less and less capable of dealing with the challenges of globali-
sation. But because the multilateral world-order is so dependent on the input of
states, multilateralism itself is not functioning well. The drama according to
Weiss (2008) is that on the other hand the UN would never have emerged at all,
if it was not configured as an instrument of state interests…
In sum, there seem to be sufficient reasons to claim that the ‘values and institu-
tions of multilateralism as currently constituted (…) are arguably under serious
challenge’ (Newman and Thakur, 2006, p. 531). But, as suggested by those same
authors, the fundamental principle of multilateralism is not in crisis! What is
needed is an aggiornamento of the organisational issues in order to be in tune
with today’s reality.15
3. Web 2.0. as a Metaphor for a Renewed 
Multilateralism
Multilateralism is thus both a normative concept (it is an ideal that some pro-
mote) and a practice (it refers to a set of existing practices and institutions). At
both levels it is subject to change and one can think of how an updated global
multilateral governance system could look like. Such a vision could be called
‘Multilateralism 2.0.’ This is a metaphor as it refers to a jargon used in the ICT
world. As all metaphors it has its limitations. But metaphors in science can also
serve the purpose of viewing things from new perspectives (Harré, 1976). There
is a long tradition within International Relations to use metaphors such as ‘bal-
ance of power’ or ‘concert of nations’ (for an overview, see Little, 2007). And as
mentioned by Fry and O’Hagan (2009, p. 10): ‘metaphors that are deployed to
understand world politics should also be seen as contributing to the constitution
of world politics’. The core of the metaphor advanced here is an implicit refer-
ence to what is now called ‘Web 2.0.’, a concept currently used to be described
as the second phase in the development of the World Wide Web. It describes the
change from a ‘web’ consisting of individual websites, to a platform of interac-
tive web applications, to the end users on the Word Wide Web. The multilater-
alism 2.0. metaphor tries to grasp how the ideals and practices of multilateral-
ism are currently undergoing a similar transformation. It is partially a descrip-
tive metaphor as it tries to capture what is going on. But it is also a normative
metaphor that points to what is possible and desirable.
3.1. The Transformation from Multilateralism 1.0. to 
Multilateralism 2.0.
Using ‘Web 2.0.’ as a metaphor in thinking about governance is, however, not
totally new. Even more: ‘Web 2.0.’ practices are influencing practices of govern-
ance today as they are increasingly finding their way into public governance.
Government 2.0. is an attempt to integrate the social networking and interactive
advantages of web 2.0. approaches into the practice of governments. As noted
by Potter (2008, p. 121): “Web 2.0. has the potential to change fundamentally
how foreign ministries manage knowledge and communicate”. Eggers (2005)
writes that there is a need for governments to move away from industrial
approaches and into the information age. In other words, move away from the
bureaucratic ideal to networked organisations. But this implies more than just
adopting Web 2.0. tools. It is also about recognising that conventional govern-
ments are unable to address society’s challenges alone. For Eggers (2005) the
shift to Government 2.0. implies that the days of government – be it national orTHE EU AS A GLOBAL ACTOR IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD AND MULTILATERAL 2.0 ENVIRONMENT
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local – acting as singular actors are over. The new paradigm is one of collabora-
tion between governments at different levels (including sub-national govern-
ments) and between governments with all other relevant actors in society. The
shift from Web 1.0. to Web 2.0. also offers new opportunities for online public
diplomacy in terms of advocacy, and policy developments between governments
and citizens across the globe to address cross-national policy challenges (Potter,
2008, p. 125). This in turn has consequences for how multilateralism is organ-
ised.
There is a long tradition of critical thinking about multilateralism and the need
to reform the present multilateral system (see De Senarclens and Kazancigil
(2007) for an overview). Even the use of the ‘Web 2.0’ metaphor in international
relations is not new. Ikenberry (2008) has proposed a somewhat similar meta-
phor in an article on ‘liberal internationalism’ and America. He proposes to
identify three major versions or models of liberal international order: versions
1.0., 2.0. and 3.0. The first is associated with Woodrow Wilson’s ideas of an
international order organised around a global collective security body in which
sovereign states act together to uphold a system of territorial peace. The second
is the more Rooseveltian idea of the US taking the lead in the post 1945 recon-
struction and leading to the American-led liberal hegemonic order. The third is
seen by Ikenberry as a post-hegemonic liberal internationalism that “has only
partially appeared and whose full shape and logic is still uncertain” (Ikenberry,
2008, p. 73). But he sees the 3.0. liberal order as one where “authority would
move toward universal institutions” (Ikenberry, 2008, p. 81) and as one where
there is a further erosion of norms of Westphalian sovereignty as well as the
continuing rise of the notion “responsibility to protect”. In my view, Ikenberry
over-emphasises the differences between the varieties of liberal internationalism
he describes. I would rather speak of versions 1.0., 1.1. and 1.2., as they all have
the centrality of states in common. And he also underestimates the current
changes and change-drivers that are affecting multilateralism as an institutional
practice.
As a result of (i) changes in (national) governance and (ii) overall changes in the
way the world is organised, we are currently witnessing the beginning of a trans-
formation from multilateralism 1.0. to multilateralism 2.0. The shift from mul-
tilateralism 1.0. to multilateralism 2.0. as I see it is characterised by the emer-
gence of network thinking and practices in international relations. In multilat-
eralism 1.0. the principle agents in the interstate space of international relations
are states. National governments are the ‘star players’. Intergovernmental
organisations are only dependent agents whose degrees of freedom only go as
far as the states allow them. The primacy of sovereignty is the ultimate principle
of international relations. In multilateralism 2.0., there are other players thanTHE EU AS A GLOBAL ACTOR IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD AND MULTILATERAL 2.0 ENVIRONMENT
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sovereign states that play a role and some of these players challenge the notion
of sovereignty. There are signs that multilateralism 2.0. is partially already there.
But of course there are also strong forces to continue with multilateralism 1.0.
As such it is not even sure that a fully fledged multilateral system, version 2.0.
will ever appear. As will be argued later, it is here were Europe can have a deci-
sive role to play.
3.2. Multilateralism 2.0. in a Renewed Multipolar 
World-order
The trend towards multipolarity is more than just a re-distribution of power at
the global level. It is also about a change in who the players are and how the
playing field is organised. This is where the concept of multilateralism 2.0. can
help to better understand what is going on.
A first characteristic of multilateralism 2.0. is the diversification of multilateral
organisations. In recent years there has been a dramatic rise of all kinds of inter-
national organisations and regimes. According to Schiavone (2001), the number
of intergovernmental organisations has grown from 37 to well over 400 in the
period between 1990 and 2000 (see also Higgott, 2006). And increasingly these
organisations look more to networks than to formal (bureaucratic) organisa-
tions. In line with a ‘trans-nationalisation of policies’ (Stone, 2004) one can state
that multilateralism 2.0. implies the rise of transnational policy networks (Djelic
and Quach, 2003; Stone, 2008).
Secondly, there is a growing importance of non-state actors at the regional
rather than global level. States have by now created a large number of global
and regional institutions that have themselves become players in the interna-
tional order. Some of these new players, although not states, do resemble states.
An institution like the EU exemplifies this trend (one can point for instance to
its presence as observer in the UN, its voting rights at the IMF and its member-
ship at the G8, etc.). Other regional organisations – although not to the same
extent as the EU – are following suit. As a result, one can say that we are cur-
rently witnessing a transition from a world of states to a world of regions (Van
Langenhove, 2008, 2009). This trend is further reinforced by the phenomenon
of devolution whereby state powers are in some states transferred to subnational
regions. And some of these subnational regional entities have growing ambitions
to be present at the international stage as well. It is a fascinating phenomenon:
both supra- and subnational governance entities are created by states and can
therefore be regarded as ‘dependent agencies’ of those states. However, once
created these entities start to have a life of their own and are not always totallyTHE EU AS A GLOBAL ACTOR IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD AND MULTILATERAL 2.0 ENVIRONMENT
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controllable by their founding fathers. The sub- and supra entities have a ten-
dency to behave ‘as if’ they were states. All of this challenges sovereignty as both
the supra-national and sub-national regions have indeed to some extent state-
hood properties. Again, the EU is exemplary as it is the only international organ-
isation that gives citizenship to the citizens of its member states (Hoeksma,
2009). Together this has weakened the Westphalian relation between state and
sovereignty. In Europe, Flanders has perhaps more autonomy in Belgium than
Luxembourg in the EU. Yet Luxembourg is considered to be a sovereign state,
while Flanders is not. It is symptomatic of this trend that the Harvard Business
Review chose as one of its ‘breakthrough ideas’ for 2010 the concept of ‘inde-
pendent diplomacy’ (Ross, 2010). In that article the question was raised: why
pretend that only nation-states shape international affairs?
Thirdly, next to the increased relations between ‘vertical’ levels of governance,
there is a growing interconnectivity between policy domains horizontally.
Finance cannot be divorced from trade, security, climate, etc. A distinctive char-
acteristic of Multilateralism 2.0. is thus that the boundaries between policy
domains (and the organisations dealing with them) are becoming more and
more permeable. Instead of clear separated areas of policy concerns that bring
with them separated institutions that deal with them, there are now communi-
ties of different actors and layers that form together a global agora of multiple
publics and plural institutions (Stone, 2008).
Finally, the involvement of citizens in multilateralism 1.0. is largely limited to
democratic representation at the state-level. The supra-national governance
layer does not foresee direct involvement of civil society or any other non-
governmental actors. In multilateralism 2.0. there is increased room for non-
governmental actors at all levels. This is perhaps the most revolutionary aspect
of multilateralism 2.0. but also the most difficult one to organise.
Organising multilateralism in a state-centric way has only been possible through
the postulate of all states being treated as equal. This means that irrespective of
the differences in territorial size, the size of population, military power or eco-
nomic strength, all states have the same legal personality. Or in other words, the
Westphalian principle of sovereign equality means one state = one vote. This
postulate does of course not correspond with reality. In multilateralism 2.0. this
can be balanced by a more flexible system that compares actors along certain
dimensions (such as economic power) regardless of the type of actors they are.
In other words, one can for instance compare big states with regions or small
states with subnational regions. As such one can picture multilateralism 2.0. as
an ad hoc order in which no single institution or organisation is the centre, no
one framework ideal. This is what Haass calls “à la carte multilateralism”. OrTHE EU AS A GLOBAL ACTOR IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD AND MULTILATERAL 2.0 ENVIRONMENT
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as Zakaria (2008, p. 242) notes: “the UN might work for one problem, NATO
for another, the OAS for a third”. This allows not only a more flexible form of
multilateralism. It could perhaps also lead to a more just system with a more
equal balance of powers.
The Multilateralism 1.0. world-order is often pictured as a stratified space of
layers of governance from local to global. Advocates of the principle of subsid-
iarity argue that all governance should be done at the lowest level possible. Oth-
ers stress that cooperation between the different layers is needed to promote
‘multi-level’ governance. But the recent reality is much more complex than a
single bottom-up hierarchical line of governance. First of all, there is no single
‘top’ level in Multilateralism 2.0. The UN and the Bretton Woods institutions
together with new fora such as the G20 stand for a plurality of top-levels. Sec-
ondly, at the regional level there is no perfect match between a regional territory
and a regional organisation. On the contrary one can identify in most cases
many different regional organisations that cover more or less the same territory.
Thirdly, there is not a fixed set of poles but there are diverse and shifting poles
at the level of continents, regions or states. Fourthly, as the multilateral theatre
is no longer uniquely the playing-ground of states, this opens the possibility for
increased civil society participation in global governance. And finally, states are
not necessarily the lowest level as in some cases subnational entities can have
their own direct relations with the regional or global level without passing
through the state level. The result is a complex web of relations between four
types of actors with statehood properties (global institutions, regional organisa-
tions, states and sub-national regional entities) together with non-state actors
such as NGOs or transnational policy networks.
The transformation from Multilateralism 1.0. to Multilateralism 2.0. is cur-
rently happening and all actors (old and new) involved will have to further
shape it and adapt to it. In the past, the principle of subsidiarity has been a
powerful guiding principle in trying to organise relations between the different
levels of governance. The complexity of Multilateralism 2.0., however, calls for
a new normative ideal to be used as guidance for good governance. One such
principle could be that of mutuality. According to this principle ‘it should be the
obligation of each level of government as it participates in joint decision-making
to foster the legitimacy and capacity of the other’. (Landy and Teles, 2001, p.
414). Applied to multilateralism 2.0., this would mean that rather than asking
the question if this or that policy item is a regional, federal, European or global
issue, the question is to ask: what conditions are necessary to enable a certain
level of government to contribute to managing the issue and how can the other
levels foster those conditions? In other words, governance at different levelsTHE EU AS A GLOBAL ACTOR IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD AND MULTILATERAL 2.0 ENVIRONMENT
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should not be seen as competing activities. Rather they should act in such a way
that they aim to strengthen the other level…
But whatever the efficient principles used to organise multilateral relations, the
main problem remains the legitimacy of global governance. Or as Lamy (2010)
recently put it: global governance is a challenge for democracy. The trend
towards multilateralism 2.0. has the potential to increase the level of participa-
tion of civil society in global governance.21
4. The Way forward for the EU
There is overwhelming evidence that the world is going through a process of
change that is unprecedented and that results in an acceleration of all kinds
of uncertainties. In such an environment, the question that matters most is
‘What’s next?’ (see Patten, 2009). Of course, no one can predict how the
world will further evolve, at best one can try to think of potential scenarios
(cf. Atalli, 2006). And also, policy-makers of all kinds can try to adapt to
change by … installing change. This is true for the world of business, but also
for political governance at the geopolitical level. Not only are we thus wit-
nessing tremendous societal changes, there is also a growing awareness of the
need for changes at the political level. Think of the ‘change we can’ adagio of
President Barack Obama or the recent idea of President Sarkozy to replace
GDP indices by Gross Welfare Product indices. The scientific community
seems to follow suit: the first strategic report of the European Research Area
Board (October 2009) calls for a ‘New Renaissance’ or a paradigm shift in
how we think, live and interact together.8 Central in the thinking of ERAB is
to address the ‘Grand Challenges’ such as climate change, energy supply,
water resources, ageing societies, healthcare and sustainable prosperity for
all. This is a challenging idea. In the past the EU has already advanced an
ambitious agenda (the ‘Lisbon agenda’) for sustainable development combin-
ing environmental, social and economical elements. But it was based upon an
idea to become the ‘most competitive economy’ in the world. This is exactly
the same strategy as all other actual and aspiring global actors set for them-
selves… As such this might be a grand strategy that opens the door to a ‘race
to the bottom’. The only alternative is to stress the growing interconnected-
ness of the world and to acknowledge that an internal agenda cannot be
achieved in isolation. It needs to be supported by an international movement
of convergence in the same directions. And we all know what direction we
have to go: to face the common global challenges. In other words, achieving
the Millennium Development Goals is the strategy that all global actors
should set for themselves.9
If Europe wants to respond adequately to the global challenges and to the newly
emerging world-order it needs as Fritz-Vannahme (2009) said ‘a new story line’.
One can point to many possible issues that could be part of such a new story-
8.  See: ‘Preparing Europe for a New Renaissance. A Strategic View of the European Research Area. First
Report of the European Research Area Board, 2009, available at http://ec.europa.eu/research/erab/pdf/
erab-first-annual-report-06102009_en.pdf.
9.  These ideas have been elaborated in one of the working groups to prepare the 2009 annual conference
of the EU-Institute for Security Studies. The author was member of that working group. See: http://
www.iss.europa.eu/fileadmin/fichiers/pdf/seminars/annual_2009/wgreport.pdf.THE EU AS A GLOBAL ACTOR IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD AND MULTILATERAL 2.0 ENVIRONMENT
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line.10 The issues raised by ERAB around the ‘New Renaissance’ idea certainly
are attractive and bear within them the possibility of finding a ‘unique selling
proposition’. Given the developments outlined in this paper, one can think of
two (inter-related) tracks that could further strengthen Europe’s position in the
multipolar world of tomorrow:
– Deepening Western integration, and
– Acting as change-agent within the multilateral system.
But both avenues need to be related to the above sketched ‘grand strategy’ aimed
at mobilising civil society and policy-makers in Europe around a central idea.
Taking the ERAB report seriously is certainly worth exploring. Europe has great
research traditions and that should offer new ways to solve problems.
4.1. Deepening Western Integration
Europe, the EU in particular, has a serious handicap in its ambition to be a
global actor. As size matters, both for economic and political power, being
divided into a plejad of small actors does not help. Of course, since the start of
the integration process after World War II a long road has been travelled. But
much more needs to be done. Notwithstanding the Euro as common currency,
economic policy is still to a large extent national policy of the member states.
The same holds for security policy. Although there are EU-wide security policy
documents, the major member states still have their own national security strat-
egies. Increased European integration seems therefore the only way forward.
Only then will the national interest of all member states become part of the
overall European interest. But perhaps an increased European integration will
not be enough to counterbalance the fact that Europe’s relevance in the world is
shrinking. Perhaps even a fully integrated Europe will not be big enough to
allow the realisation of its global ambitions. In this context, transatlantic rela-
tions gain importance. A strong partnership between the EU and the US can
strengthen their common economic position in the emerging multipolar system.
It can also consolidate the position in the global multilateral fora and it can help
to defend better common European and Western values.
EU-US relations are currently firmly anchored in the NATO context. But the
Alliance focuses on security issues and it is going through a reform process of
which the outcome is uncertain. Meanwhile, the EU and US economies are very
10.  Fritz-Vannahme (2009 p. 1) refers to Timothy Garton Ash as the one who has pointed out on several
occasions that the EU lacks a credible story. The concept of ‘grand strategy’ has been advanced by Biscop
(2009).THE EU AS A GLOBAL ACTOR IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD AND MULTILATERAL 2.0 ENVIRONMENT
23
much interconnected. The current trade and investment ties between both are
deeper and thicker than between any other two continents. In 2007, the Trans-
atlantic Economic Council was established in order to advance bilateral efforts
to reduce regulatory and other barriers to trade. And although trade disputes
concern only about 2% of trade volume, they do concern major issues and
industrial sectors.
Today’s world of trade relations is characterized by a dense web of free trade
agreements. According to the WTO, the number of FTAs amounts to more than
400. The EU is an active player at the level of FTAs. Not only is it itself a
regional trade agreement, it also has an active policy of signing such agreements
with states and regional organizations across the world (De Lombaerde and
Schulz, 2009). Currently the EU is the champion of interregional relations
worldwide (Söderbaum and Van Langenhove, 2006), except for North America
(Aggarwal and Fogarty, 2006).
It is indeed remarkable that there exists no FTA between the EU and the US.
Deepening EU-US transatlantic relations by developing for instance a customs
union would be a major undertaking that cannot be seen separated of its
broader geopolitical context (see for instance Balladur, 2008). It would consti-
tute a major step towards a transatlantic policy outside NATO. And it would
have the potential to act as a counterforce to the BRICs. As Steingart (2008,
p. 251) notes: ‘It makes sense to pursue the idea of a transatlantic alliance, as
implausible as it may sound. The idea is unreal – as unreal as the idea of a
European Union after the end of World War II’. But then, already in 1962, US
President J.F. Kennedy noted the following, in his address delivered on Amer-
ica’s Independence Day: ‘The United States will be ready for a Declaration of
Interdependence, that we will be prepared to discuss with a united Europe the
ways and means of forming a concrete Atlantic partnership’. It might well be
that today’s increasingly multipolar world with its global challenges provides
the right context for such a project. Nevertheless, the water still seems deep.
When Angela Merkel proposed such a transatlantic FTA in 2008, her proposal
was not well received. But meanwhile, talks between the EU and Canada have
started. And a recent resolution of the European Parliament calls for using the
Transatlantic Council to achieve a unified transatlantic market by 2015.11
Equally so there is room for increased integration between the EU and Russia
and its sphere of influence. Currently Russia is facing a demographic challenge
too. Some estimates project a fall from 141 million people today to below 100
11.  This resolution was based on a report that emerged from the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
European Parliament: ‘Report on the State of Transatlantic Relations in the Aftermath of the US Elec-
tions’ (2008/2/99(INI), Brussels, 23 March 2009. See also: Zabarowski (2009, p. 236).THE EU AS A GLOBAL ACTOR IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD AND MULTILATERAL 2.0 ENVIRONMENT
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million by 2050 (Acharya, 2009). And its combined GDP is only a fraction of
that of the EU. In the geographical space between the EU and Russia are a
number of countries that are somehow between two ‘poles of attraction’. As
there is little prospect for EU membership on the one hand and as the economic
position of Russia is currently not such that it can give much help, these coun-
tries risk to continue facing big economic and political problems. An increased
economic integration between the EU, Russia and the pivotal countries in
between could be the way forward.
The overall result could even be a new economic power that comprises the US,
Russia and the EU. Such a ‘pole’ or regional powerhouse could perhaps be big
enough to compete with ‘the rest of the world’.
4.2. Acting as a Change-Agent in the UN System
In a multilateral 2.0. world-order, states, international and regional organisa-
tions, transnational policy networks and non-governmental actors are the build-
ing blocks of the multilateral system. In other words, states are no longer the
‘star players’ but only players. Moreover, it is no longer possible to make a clear
distinction between states and international organisations as some of the latter
have statehood properties as well! Furthermore, the interactions between all
these actors are not organised in a hierarchical way but in a networked way.
This implies that there is no single ‘centre of the universe’ in terms of govern-
ance. It also implies that there are sufficient ‘theatres’ of multilateral relations.
The old multilateral 1.0. system has become only one of the many playing fields.
With multilateralism 2.0. we are experiencing what Bull (2002, p. 108) calls the
international political moves or ‘many chessboards’.
Such a multilateralism 2.0. that operates in a multipolar world could give good
prospects for generating a non-hegemonic world-order. Such a world-order has
been described by Acharya (2008) as one that is not simply a function of the
power and preferences of hegemonic states. Instead one can expect a fluid web
of multi-stakeholder partnerships between different types of actors at different
levels of governance including the regional level. Baldwin and Low (2008) have
recently made the case for a ‘multilateralising’ of (economic) regionalism. It
could well be that an opposite trend will occur as well: the regionalisation of
multilateralism. This is in line with a realistic view on what the UN and other
international organisations can do and cannot do. One has to ‘recognise that
many multilateral processes will work most effectively at the regional level,
based upon shared values, identity and regional leadership’ (Newman and
Thakur, 2006, p. 539). Or as Verhofstadt (2010, p. 69) put it: integraton thatTHE EU AS A GLOBAL ACTOR IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD AND MULTILATERAL 2.0 ENVIRONMENT
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transcends borders is the logical response to the 21st century realities. So regions
could become major ‘nodes’ in the system. On the one hand they are to be con-
sidered as sub-global entities characterised by a dense intensity of economic and
political relations that can be relatively autonomous of the rest of the world. On
the other hand they have a ‘centre of gravity’ that can act as a ‘pole’ in the
multipolar world.
As Europe is the most regionalised region in the world, with a regional organi-
sation (the EU) that aspires to be a global power, it could play a central role in
transforming the current multilateral system. Actually, it might also be that
Europe needs to play that role in order to safeguard its own position. As Renard
(2009, p. 7) put it: ‘Either the EU participates in the shaping of the coming order
and becomes one of its major poles, or it will be relegated to the position of a
mere spectator in global affairs’. The EU’s plea for a more ‘effective multilater-
alism’ goes in that direction and can be seen as a (timid) attempt to influence the
multilateral playing field. But there is still a long way to go. At the level of the
WTO, the EU is talking with one voice: it is the EU Commissioner for Trade
who negotiates at the Doha Development Round on behalf of all EU Member
States. But at the IMF or the World Bank, Europe is not yet at that point.
Meanwhile, multilateralism 2.0. is becoming more and more a reality, also with
the creation of the G20. The current G20 is focusing on the impact of the eco-
nomic crisis but is an innovation that can be exported to other policy domains,
including peace and security. 19 out of the 20 members of the G20 are states.
Only one of them is a regional organisation. Giving a bigger role to regional
organisations in the multilateral system might be the innovation to pursue. Not
only in the G20 but also in the Security Council and the Bretton Woods agencies.
Europe could take the lead in this.27
5. Conclusions
World-orders do not change overnight. It took three and a half centuries to
develop Westphalia into how it looks today. And, equally important, it mean-
while never was consolidated into one single document. Furthermore, multilat-
eralism 1.0. and the related idea of a liberal international order is still a relatively
young child of Westphalia. And meanwhile globalisation now challenges that
Westphalian world-order. However, neither states nor multilateral organisations
are passively undergoing the forces of globalisation and the many technological
changes that are altering the face of the world. They are changing themselves as
well, as they are stimulating changes in governance by inventing or introducing
new practices and norms. Some of the multilateral organisations have moved
away from the old-fashioned organisational forms such as holding a General
Assembly meeting that lasts for weeks. The OECD is exemplary of this trend
and could become a model for other international organisations (Schäfer, 2006).
The problem is that there does not yet seem to be an overall normative policy-
framework to guide actions. Of course one cannot hope that one single set of
ideas could even be a ‘solution’ to all current problems. Working towards such
an ideology would for sure be counter-productive and perhaps even dangerous.
But it cannot be denied that normative concepts and clear visions of where to go
are an important element of any strategic change process. It is not without rea-
sons that in organisational reform so much emphasis is put on the development
of visions and mission statements as the basis of strategic planning processes.
This has also been the case when multilateralism was originally shaped.
In sum, the signs are there that multilateralism is moving from a 1.0. mode to a
2.0. mode. But as mentioned before, states have been the architects of multilat-
eralism 1.0. and they crafted a form of multilateralism that is in tune with state
interests. The big challenge today is whether non-state actors will have the
power and the degrees of liberty to be involved in crafting multilateralism 2.0.
At least one such an actor, the EU, has the ambition to be involved in such an
operation. With its embracing of the principle of ‘effective multilateralism’ it has
clearly indicated to be willing to contribute to reforming multilateralism. But the
paradox might be that its own member states with their own 1.0. forms of diplo-
macy are perhaps not yet ready for such a move.29
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